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Abstract—We study the adaptive modulation (AM) problem
in a network-coded two-way relay channel (NC-TWRC), where
each of the two users controls its own bit rate in the m-ary
quadrature amplitude modulation (m-QAM) to minimize the
transmission error rate and enhance the spectral efficiency. We
show that there exists a strategic complementarity, one user tends
to transmit while the other decides to do so in order to enhance
the overall spectral efficiency, which is beyond the scope of the
conventional single-agent AM scheduling method. We propose
a two-player game model parameterized by the signal-to-noise
ratios (SNRs) of two user-to-user channels and prove that it is a
supermodular game where there always exist the extremal pure
strategy Nash equilibria (PSNEs), the largest and smallest PSNEs.
We show by simulation results that the extremal PSNEs incur
a similar bit error rate (BER) as the conventional single-agent
AM scheme, but significantly improve the spectral efficiency in
the NC-TWRC system. The study also reveals the Pareto order
of the extremal PSNEs: The largest and smallest PSNEs are
Pareto worst and best PSNEs, respectively. Finally, we derive
the sufficient conditions for the extremal PSNEs to be symmetric
and monotonic in channel SNRs. We also discuss how to utilize
the symmetry and monotonicity to relieve the complexity in the
PSNE learning process.
Index Terms—adaptive modulation, amplify-and-forward,
monotonic comparative statics, physical layer network coding,
strategic complementarity, super/submodularity, supermodular
game.
I. INTRODUCTION
The method of adaptive modulation (AM) [1]–[4] is to
adjust the modulation scheme in response to the time-varying
feature of wireless fading channel. Consider Fig. 1 for ex-
ample. According to the channel state information (CSI), a
scheduler increases the transmission rate in m-ary quadrature
amplitude modulation (m-QAM) under favorable channel con-
ditions, e.g., high instantaneous signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio,
and reduces it when the channel quality degrades [1]. The
adaptive m-QAM modulation system in Fig. 1 poses a single-
agent decision-making problem: The scheduler controls the bit
rate of m-QAM Tx/Rx by considering the SNR of the wireless
fading channel. The purpose is to optimize the transmission
error rate and spectral efficiency.1
Consider the two-way relay network in Fig. 2. There are
two terminal/end users communicating with each other via a
relay, the center node labeled by ‘R’. The relay exchanges the
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1Since there is a tradeoff between transmission error rate and spectral
efficiency, the aim of the AM schemes in [1]–[4] is to determine the optimal
transmission rate by satisfying a certain bit error rate (BER) constraint.
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Fig. 1. Single-user variable-rate adaptive m-QAM modulation in wireless
transmission [1]–[3]: the number of bits per QAM symbol of the m-QAM
transmitter/receiver (Tx/Rx) is controlled by a scheduler.
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Fig. 2. Two-phase physical layer network coding (PNC) scheme using
amplify-and-forward (AF) protocol [5], [6] in network-coded two-way relay
channel (NC-TWRC).
messages from users 1 and 2 by adopting a two-phase amplify-
and-forward network coding scheme [5], [6]. In phase I, the
multiple access (MAC) stage, two users transmit messages x1
and x2 to relay simultaneously. In phase II, the amplify and
forward (AF) stage, the relay broadcasts z, the superposition
of the received signals in phase I. Since a user knows its own
message, each user subtracts the self-interference term from z
and extracts the message sent by the other. It was shown in
[5] that this network coding scheme offered a higher spectral
efficiency than the conventional one-way relaying method. We
call the system in Fig. 2 network-coded two-way relay channel
(NC-TWRC).
By assuming that both terminal users in Fig. 2 adopt
adaptive m-QAM modulation mechanism in Fig. 1, we have
an adaptive m-QAM NC-TWRC system as shown in Fig. 3.
The problem left to each scheduler is how to find the best
transmission scheme that minimizes the transmission error rate
and improves the total spectral efficiency in NC-TWRC. One
way to solve the problem is to directly apply the conventional
single-agent AM method in Fig. 1 as in [7]–[9], e.g., letting
the users make decisions separately based on SNRs of their
corresponding user-to-user channels without considering the
other users decision/action. But, does this method give rise to
the optimal AM scheme? We show in the following context
that the conventional single-agent AM scheme is not the best
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Fig. 3. Adaptive m-QAM modulation in NC-TWRC: Each scheduler makes
its own decision to optimize its transmission error rate and the spectral
efficiency in the entire system.
choice for NC-TWRC.
A. Motivation
In any AM method for NC-TWRC, the decisions of both
schedulers are made in phase I, the MAC phase. By consider-
ing the SNRs of user-to-user channels, the transmission error
rate in the system is minimized. But, does the conventional
single-agent AM method also optimize the spectral efficiency
(the average transmission rate) in NC-TWRC? Before answer-
ing this question, it is worth discussing what contributes to
the overall spectral efficiency in NC-TWRC. It can be seen in
Fig. 2 that the spectral efficiency is determined by the number
of bits per transmission, or broadcast, at the relay in phase II,
which is affected by the decisions of both schedulers in phase
I. So, a decision made by just considering the user-to-user
channels does not necessarily optimize the spectral efficiency.
For example, assume that the SNR of user 1-to-user 2
channel is very low and by following the single-agent AM
scheme, scheduler 1 would choose holding (not transmitting)
in order to maintain a good average transmission error rate.
Assume that scheduler 2 decides to transmit an 8-QAM
symbol at this time. Due to scheduler 2’s action, if scheduler
1 changes his/her decision to transmitting, the number of bits
broadcast by the relay in phase II will be increased from
3 to at least 4. If the gain in spectral efficiency is greater
than the loss in transmission error rate, holding is not so
good as transmitting for scheduler 1, i.e., the single-agent AM
transmission scheme is not optimal in this case. In addition to
deciding whether or not to transmit, scheduler 1 should also
determine the number of bits in the QAM symbol, e.g., 2, 4
or 8-QAM, by considering the quantified gains and losses in
both transmission error rate and spectral efficiency.
From this example, it can be seen that the spectral efficiency
in NC-TWRC depends on the joint decisions of both sched-
ulers. Therefore, to make optimal decisions in the adaptive
m-QAM NC-TWRC system in Fig. 3, a scheduler should
consider not only the SNR of the user-to-user channel, but
also the decision made by the other scheduler. Then, the AM
problem in NC-TWRC is a multi-agent, instead of a single-
agent, optimization problem.
B. Main Results
This paper considers a game theoretic approach, a multi-
agent decision-making framework, for the AM problem in the
NC-TWRC in Fig. 3. Based on the analysis in Section I-A,
we can see that, for the purpose of enhancing the spectral
efficiency, a scheduler tends to transmit by knowing the other
decides to do so. This strategic complementarity is naturally
captured by the supermodular game theory [10]–[12], we
propose a two-player game model for the AM problem in
NC-TWRC and prove the supermodularity of it. We show that
the supermodularity of game guarantees the existence of pure
strategy Nash equilibria (PSNEs) and the two extremal, the
largest and smallest, PSNEs can be determined by a greedy
recursive algorithm within a finite number of iterations. Our
study also reveals the Pareto order of the extremal PSNEs,
where it is shown that the largest and smallest PSNEs are
Pareto worst and best PSNEs, respectively. Finally, we derive
the sufficient conditions for the extremal PSNEs to be sym-
metric and monotonic in channel SNRs.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the
AM problem in NC-TWRC is considered and optimized from
the perspective of game theory. In this paper, the analysis of
the game model and Nash equilibria (NEs) are mainly based
on studies on supermodular game theory [10]–[12]. The main
results are listed below:
• two-player game formulation: In order to solve the adap-
tive m-QAM modulation problem in Fig. 3, we propose
a two-player game model parameterized by the SNRs of
two user-to-user channels. The purpose is to determine
the joint strategies of schedulers, the bit rates of both m-
QAM Txs/Rxs, such that the transmission error rate and
spectral efficiency in the NC-TWRC are optimized.
• existence and performance of extremal PSNEs: We prove
that PSNEs always exist in this game and the largest
and smallest PSNEs can be searched by finite iterations
of Cournot tatonnement [13]. We show that Cournot
tatonnement can be implemented online so that the two
schedulers gradually update their strategies to and finally
reach the extremal PSNEs. We run simulations to show
that the extremal PSNEs are superior to the conventional
single-agent AM schemes in enhancing the spectral effi-
ciency in the NC-TWRC system.
• Pareto order of extremal PSNEs: We show that the small-
est PSNE Pareto dominates the largest one. Therefore, the
smallest PSNE is always preferred to the largest one by
both schedulers.
• symmetry and monotonicity of extremal PSNEs: We de-
rive the sufficient conditions for the extremal PSNEs
to be symmetric and nondecreasing in the SNRs of
two user-to-user channels. We show that symmetry and
monotonicity of PSNEs can be utilized to relieve the
computational complexity of the PSNE learning process,
e.g., the Cournot tatonnement algorithm.
C. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the system in Fig. 3, clarify the assumptions
and state the optimization problem on designing the AM
scheme in NC-TWRC. In Section III, we present a two-
player game model formulation for the AM problem in Fig. 3.
In Section IV, we prove the supermodularity of this game,
the existence of the extremal PSNEs and their Pareto order.
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We also run a simulation to show the performance of the
extremal PSNEs. In Section V, we study the symmetry and
monotonicity of the extremal PSNEs in channel SNRs.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the NC-TWRC system in Fig. 3, schedulers 1 and 2
decide the number of bits per QAM symbol of their own m-
QAM Txs/Rxs. The objective of each scheduler is two-fold:
(a) to minimize the BER over the user-to-user channel, and (b)
to optimize the spectral efficiency, i.e., maximize the number
of bits exchanged between two users. Let i = {1, 2}, we list
the assumption in this system as follows.
Assumption 2.1: Let ai ∈ Ai = {0, 1, . . . , Am} be the
strategy taken by scheduler i. ai denotes the number of bits
per QAM symbol except that ai = 0 denotes no transmission.
A decision that determines the value of ai is made at each
symbol duration by scheduler i.
Assumption 2.2: We assume that users adopt amplify-and-
forward physical layer network coding (AF-PNC) scheme
[6], [7], [14], [15] as follows. In Fig. 2, assume that x1
and x2 are two messages sent from user 1 and user 2,
respectively, in phase I. The received signal at the relay is
z =
∑2
i=1
√
Pihixi + nr. The relay broadcasts an amplified
version of z to the end users in phase II. Here, Pi is the
symbol power consumed by scheduler i to transmit xi, hi is
the gain of the fading channel from user i to the relay, nr
is the noise at the relay. Scheduler i receives the broadcast
signal yi = G
√
Prhiz + ni where Pr is the power consumed
by the relay to broadcast z and ni is the noise at user i. Since
scheduler i knows its own symbol, the self interference term
G
√
Pr
√
Pih
2
ixi is subtracted from yi. The remaining signal
yˆi = G
√
Pr
√
P−ihih−ix−i +G
√
Pihinr + ni
is demodulated. Here, −i = {1, 2} \ i denotes the other
scheduler/user. Let σ2r , σ21 and σ22 be the noise power of nr,
n1 and n2, respectively. G is a scaling factor that the relay
uses to normalize the average per-symbol power and is given
by G =
√
1
P1|h1|2+P2|h2|2+σ2r
[7], [14], [15]. Denote γi the
SNR of the wireless channel from user i to −i and assume
that the user-to-relay channels are reciprocal. The value of γi
is [6]
γi =
PrPi|hi|
2|h
−i|
2
σ2
−i
σ2
r
P
−i|h−i|2
σ2
−i
+ 1
G2σ2
r
. (1)
Assumption 2.3: The schedulers and relay trans-
mit/broadcast symbols by unit transmission power, i.e.,
Pr = P1 = P2 = 1. Scheduler i obtains the instantaneous
values of both γ1 and γ2 to assist the decision making. Let
Γi be the set that contains all possible values of γi and
Γ = Γ1 × Γ2, where × denotes the Cartesian product. We
define an SNR vector γ = (γ1, γ2) ∈ Γ. Here, Γi could be
an infinite or finite set. The game model proposed in this
paper can be applied to both cases. But, we just consider the
finite case, i.e., the entire SNR range is quantized into finite
number of regions so that Γi is a finite set for i ∈ {1, 2}.
It should be noted that there exist channel estimation
methods for each scheduler to obtain the instantaneous value
of γ1 and γ2. For example, by adopting the two-phase training
protocol proposed in [16], the instantaneous values of h1 and
h2 can be estimated. By assuming that both schedulers obtain
the values of σ21 , σ22 and σ2r , γ1 and γ2 can be derived by
(1). Since this paper considers game with perfect information,
we assume perfect channel estimation. Also, the channel
estimation techniques may vary with the network coding (NC)
scheme, e.g., if we adopt other NC, the expression of γi in
(1) would be different. However, it would not affect the main
results derived in Sections IV and V.
III. GAME FORMULATION
As discussed in Section I-A, to optimize BER and spectral
efficiency in NC-TWRC, a scheduler needs to consider not
only the SNR of user-to-user channel but also the other
scheduler’s decision, i.e., the two users interact with each other
via their actions. The AM problem in Fig. 3 is a multi-agent
optimization one. In this section, we propose a two-player
game model.
A. Two-player Game model
Consider modeling the adaptive m-QAM modulation
problem in Fig. 3 by a two-player game Ωγ =
{N,Γ, {Ai, ci(γi, a)}Ni=1}.2 In this game,
• N = 2 denotes the number of schedulers/users;
• a = (a1, a2) ∈ A is a strategy profile, the joint
strategy taken by two schedulers, and A = A1 × A2 =
{0, 1, . . . , Am}2 is the strategy profile set. We also use
the notation a = (ai, a−i) in this paper, where ai and
a−i denotes the strategy of scheduler i and the strategy
of the other scheduler, respectively;
• ci : Γi × A 7→ R+ is the cost function that quantifies
the losses associated with transmission error rate and
spectrum efficiency. We define ci as
ci(γi, a) = ci(γi, ai, a−i)
= wce(γi, ai) + ct(ai) + cr(a), (2)
where w > 0 is a weight factor. ce, ct and cr are defined
as follows.
Firstly, we define ce : Γi × Ai 7→ R+ as the cost function
that quantifies the loss incurred by the transmission BER. We
consider two expressions of ce. One is
ce(γi, ai) = 0.2 exp
(
− 1.5γi
2ai − 1
)
, (3)
where ce denotes the upper BER bound of transmitting 2ai-
QAM symbol when the SNR of the user-to-user channel is γi
[1], [3], [18]. The other is
ce(γi, ai) =
− ln(5P¯b)(2ai − 1)
1.5γi
, (4)
where ce denotes the minimal symbol power required to
transmit 2ai-QAM symbol with an average BER less than
a constraint P¯b ≤ 0.2. In this paper, we set P¯b = 10−3.
2The normal form game model is Ω = {N, {Ai, ci(a)}Ni=1} [17]. Here,
Ωγ can be considered a normal form game that is parameterized by γ, i.e.,
for each value of γ, there is a game in normal form.
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Note, defining ce as in (4) does not necessarily mean that
variable symbol power will be consumed to transmit 2ai-
QAM symbols. As assumed in Assumption 2.3, we consider
constant transmission power in this paper. Equation (4) just
shows another way of quantifying the transmission error loss.
In Section V, we will show the advantage of defining ce as in
(4): The resulting PSNEs are monotonically increasing in γ.
Next, we define ct : Ai 7→ R+ as
ct(ai) =
1
ai + 1
so that ct is inversely proportional to the transmission rate of
user i. We define cr : Ai 7→ R+ as
cr(a) =
a−i
ai + 1
.
Here, cr models the strategic complementary behaviors of
two schedulers when they are trying to enhance the spectral
efficiency: In order to minimize cr, if scheduler −i increases
a−i, scheduler i tends to increase ai. On the other hand, the
definition of cr also promotes equal share of the spectrum of
the communication channel between two users. The equilib-
rium point by considering cr alone is when users take the same
strategy, i.e., ai = a−i.
It can be seen that ct(ai) + cr(a) = a−i+1ai+1 determines the
costs in losing spectral efficiency in NC-TWRC. Therefore, ci
is a weighted-sum cost of transmission error rate and spectral
efficiency.3 We show in Section III-C that the game model
differs from the conventional single-agent AM method in the
presence of cr.
B. Nash Equilibria
Denote a pure strategy θ : Γ 7→ A as θ(γ) = (θ1(γ), θ2(γ))
where θi(γ) determines the strategy of scheduler i by follow-
ing θ when the SNR vector γ takes certain value. The pure
strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (PSNE): A pure strategy θ∗ is a Nash equi-
librium of Ωγ if
ci(γi, θ
∗
i (γ), θ
∗
−i(γ)) ≤ ci(γi, θi(γ), θ∗−i(γ))
for all i ∈ {1, 2}, θi and γ .
It should be noted that although we show that the sched-
ulers’ actions are interacting with each other in Section I-A, a
PSNE is a function of just γ = (γ1, γ2), i.e., if a PSNE θ is
adopted as the AM scheme in Fig. 3, each scheduler is only
required to know the instantaneous SNRs or two user-to-user
channels instead of the other scheduler’s strategy.
C. Comparison with Single-agent AM Method
One can see that if we omit cr in the cost function ci, the
optimization problem reduces to
min
ai∈Ai
{wce(γi, ai) + ct(ai)}, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, (5)
3Since there is naturally a tradeoff between transmission error rate and
spectral efficiency, they cannot be optimized at the same time. In the definition
of ci in (2), we adopted the scalarization approach in the multi-objective
optimization [19]: defining the total cost as the weighted-sum of all costs.
The purpose is to seek the Pareto optimality between transmission error rate
and spectral efficiency.
which is a conventional single-agent AM problem as proposed
in [1]–[4]. The optimization problem in (5) can be solved
separately for two terminal users, where the optimal decision
of user i is a function of the corresponding user-to-user SNR
γi. But, this is not the case in the presence of cr in the cost
function ci, since the action should be optimal to not only γi
but also a−i, the other scheduler’s action. This problem cannot
be solved separately for the two users. Instead, the interaction
of users should be studied in order to seek the optimal or
equilibrium point.
It should be pointed out that both the conventional single-
agent AM method and the game-theoretical AM approach
proposed in this paper require the decision-making at the end
users rather than the relay, i.e., in phase II, the relay simply
amplifies and forwards whatever it receives from the two end
users without any scheduling. The difference lies in what needs
to be known to assist the decision-making: In the conventional
single-agent AM method, each user only needs to know the
SNR of its corresponding user-to-user channel, i.e., user 1
knows γ1 and user 2 knows γ2; In the game-theoretical AM
approach, both users need to know γ1 and γ2, the SNRs of two
user-to-user channels. However, according to equation (1), the
values of both γi depend on the estimations of h1 and h2. If
we adopt the channel estimation technique proposed in [16],
the values of h1 and h2 can be estimated at both end users. In
this case, the overhead in obtaining the necessary information
for adopting an PSNE are the same as in the conventional
single-agent AM method.
IV. EXISTENCE AND PARETO ORDER OF PSNES
Pure strategy is always more preferred to randomized one
because of its simplicity. But, Narsh equilibrium is not in the
form of pure strategy in general. The remaining question is
whether one can prove the existence of PSNEs in Ωγ . In this
section we show that this question can be easily answered by
showing the supermodularity of game Ωγ . The work in this
section is based on the studies on supermodular game in [10],
[11], [20]. For the definitions of related concepts, e.g., partially
ordered set (poset) and complete lattice, we refer the reader
to Appendix A.
A. Preliminaries
We first introduce the definitions of super/submodularity and
supermodular game (SupG) and some existing results on SupG
as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Super/submodularity [12]): f : ZK 7→ R is
supermodular if f(x) + f(y) ≤ f(x ∨ y) + f(x ∧ y) for all
x,y ∈ ZK . g : ZK 7→ R is submodular if −g is supermodular.
∨ and ∧ denote componentwise maximization and minimiza-
tion, respectively.
Definition 4.2 (SupG [11], [20]): Ωγ is supermodular if
Ai is a complete lattice4 and ci is submodular in a = (a1, a2)
for all i and γ.5
4See the definition of complete lattice in Appendix A.
5
‘Supermodular’ in SupG denotes the supermodularity of the utility func-
tion in the game model. Since the cost is the negative of utility, the
submodularity of the cost function contributes to the supermodularity of game.
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Due to Tarski’s fixed point theorem [21], PSNEs always
exist in SupG [10]. Besides, a SupG also has the following
properties.
Lemma 4.3 (Properties of SupG [10], [11], [20]): If Ωγ
is supermodular, the following hold.
(a) PSNE exists. For each γ, the set of PSNEs is a complete
lattice, i.e., there exist a largest PSNE θ∗ and a smallest
PSNE θ∗.
(b) θ∗ and θ∗ can be found by Cournot tatonnement: Define
maximal best response function ψ : Γ×A 7→ A with the
ith tuple being
ψi(γ, a−i) = max{argmin
ai∈Ai
ci(γi, ai, a−i)}.
Let θ(0)(γ) = sup(A) for all γ.6 The sequence {θ(k)(γ)}
generated by iteration
θ(γ) := ψ(γ, θ(γ))
converges monotonically downward to θ∗(γ) for all γ.
Similarly, Let ψ be the minimal best response function
and θ(0)(γ) = inf(A) for all γ. The sequence {θ(k)(γ)}
generated by iteration
θ(γ) := ψ(γ, θ(γ))
converges monotonically upward to θ∗(γ) for all γ.
(c) If ci(ai, a−i) is nondecreasing in a−i for all i, then PSNEs
are Pareto ordered such that
ci(γi, θ
∗(γ)) ≤ ci(γi, θ∗(γ))
for all i and γ, i.e., θ∗ Pareto dominates θ∗.
B. Existence and Cournot Tatonnement of Extremal PSNEs
Based on Lemma 4.3(a), we prove the existence of extremal
PSNEs in Ωγ as follows.
Theorem 4.4: Ωγ is supermodular for all γ, where PSNEs
exist. The largest and smallest PSNEs, θ∗ and θ∗, can be found
by Cournot tatonnement.
Proof: According to Definition A.2, it is straightforward
to see that Ai = {0, 1, . . . , Am} is a complete lattice. Consider
the submodularity of ci on the strategy profile space. Since
ci(γi, ai + 1, a−i) + ci(γi, ai, a−i + 1)
− ci(γi, ai + 1, a−i + 1)− ci(γi, ai, a−i)
= cr(ai + 1, a−i) + cr(ai, a−i + 1)
− cr(ai, a−i)− cr(ai + 1, a−i + 1)
=
1
ai
− 1
ai + 1
≥ 0, (6)
by Definition 4.1, ci is submodular in a = (ai, a−i) for all γ
and i ∈ {1, 2}.7 Therefore, according to Definition 4.2, game
Ωγ is supermodular. By Lemma 4.3(a) and (b), the largest
and smallest PSNEs, θ∗ and θ∗, exists, and can be found by
Cournot tatonnement.
6sup(A) and inf(A) denote the componentwise supremum and infimum
of A, respectively. Since A is a finite set, sup(A) and inf(A) denote the
componentwise maximum and minimum of A, respectively.
7In (6), we show submodularity for the function defined on 2-dimensional
integer space. Based on Definition 4.1, f : Z2 7→ R is sub-
modular, f(x+1 , x
−
2 ) + f(x
−
1 , x
+
2 ) ≥ f(x
−
1 , x
−
2 ) + f(x
+
1 , x
+
2 ) for all
x−1 , x
+
1 , x
−
2 , x
+
2 ∈ Z such that x
+
1 ≥ x
−
1 and x
+
2 ≥ x
−
2 .
1 2 3 4
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Fig. 4. The sequences {θ(k)1 (γ)} and {θ
(k)
1 (γ)} generated by Cournot
tatonnement, when Am = 9 and the SNR vector (in ratio) is γ = (γ1, γ2) =
(7, 8). In this case, the sequence {θ(k)1 (γ)} converges to θ
∗
1(γ), the first tuple
in the largest PSNE θ∗(γ). The sequence {θ(k)1 (γ)} converges to θ∗1(γ),
the first tuple in the smallest PSNE θ∗(γ), at the 3rd iteration.
Example 4.5: In Fig. 4, we show the examples of the
sequences {θ(k)1 (γ)} and {θ(k)1 (γ)}. We set Am = 9 and the
SNR vector (in ratio) as γ = (γ1, γ2) = (7, 8). We first start
the iteration θ(γ) := ψ(γ, θ(γ)) in Cournot tatonnement with
θ
(0)
= sup(A) = (Am, Am) = (9, 9). We plot θ(k)1 (γ), the
first tuple in θ(k)(γ), in Fig. 4. It can be seen that the sequence
{θ(k)1 (γ)} converges monotonically downward to the largest
PSNE θ∗1(γ). We then run the iteration θ(γ) := ψ(γ, θ(γ))
that starts with θ(0) = inf(A) = (0, 0). We plot θ(k)1 (γ) in
Fig. 4. It can be seen that the sequence {θ(k)1 (γ)} converges
monotonically upward to the smallest PSNE {θ∗1(γ)}.
In fact, Fig. 4 presents a method of learning the extremal
PSNEs, θ∗ and θ∗, by Cournot tatonnemen. Assume that θ∗
and θ∗ are not available to the two users at the beginning.
To learn them, or one of them, the only thing to do is to
implement the greedy Cournot tatonnemen algorithm. Based
on the convergence results in Fig. 4, θ∗ and θ∗ for each
γ can be learned within a finite number of iterations. In
addition, the users can learn the extremal PSNEs online. Let
the two users adopt strategy θ(γ) = sup(A) initially. In
the first symbol duration, let user i take the action ai =
max{argminai∈Ai ci(γi, ai, θ−i(γ))} based on the channel
SNRs γ = (γ1, γ2). Then, at the end of the symbol duration,
each user knows the other’s action a−i and does the update
θ(γ) = (ai, a−i).
8 In the second symbol duration, repeat the
same procedure and so on. By doing so, each user can adapt
the strategy θ(γ) towards the largest PSNE θ∗ for each γ
gradually. The smallest PSNE can be learned online in the
same way.
It should be pointed out that there exist PSNEs other than
the two extremal ones. But, we are just interested in θ∗ and
8The actual implementation may require more signaling information. For
example, the user needs to let the other know which action he/she takes
for demodulation and/or online implementation of the Cournot tatonnemen
algorithm. This problem can be solved by implementing the AM method at a
packet level instead of a symbol level so that the overhead information can be
included in the packet header. Whether the AM is done on packet or symbol
level does not affect the main results in this paper.
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Fig. 5. BER (left) and spectral efficiency (right) vs. average SNR γ¯ by following the strategies in the experiment in Example 4.6. The simulation lasts for
104 symbol durations. Spectral efficiency is obtained as the number of bits exchanged at the relay averaged over symbol durations, which also denotes the
average number of bits sent by both users. γ¯ denotes the average SNR of both user-to-user channels. We set Am = 9. The extremal PSNEs, θ
∗
and θ∗, in
the experiment in Example 4.6 are obtained by Cournot tatonnement.
θ∗ since they are the ones that can be found directly by the
existing Cournot tatonnemen algorithm. Also, in Section IV-D,
the Pareto order of the PSNEs shows that the smallest PSNE
θ∗ is the best AM scheme since it Pareto dominates all other
PSNEs. Therefore, in reality θ∗ may be the only one that is
of interest.
C. Simulation Results
To show the performance of the extremal PSNEs, θ∗ and
θ
∗
, we do the following experiment.
Example 4.6: We run a simulation that lasts 104 symbol
durations, where h1 and h2, the gains of two user-to-relay
channels, are both Rayleigh distributed. Let γ¯i denote the aver-
age channel SNR from user i to user −i. We set γ¯1 = γ¯2 = γ¯
and vary the value of γ¯ from −6dB to 7dB. Let γimin and
γimax denote the maximum and minimum values of γi (in
ratio), respectively. We choose 100 SNR levels in [γimin, γimax]
with step size γimax−γimin100 to constitute the finite set Γi for all
i ∈ {1, 2}. The strategies used in simulation are listed below.
• We consider two sets of PSNEs based on SupG model
with Am = 9. The first group contains:
– SupG-BER-θ∗ and SupG-BER-θ∗: They are the
largest and smallest PSNEs when we adopt the SupG
model with the cost function ce being ce(γi, ai) =
0.2 exp
(− 1.5γi2ai−1
)
and weight factor w being 50.
– SupG-Pr-θ∗ and SupG-Pr-θ∗: They are the largest
and smallest PSNEs when we adopt the SupG
model with the cost function ce being ce(γi, ai) =
− ln(5P¯b)(2
ai−1)
1.5γi
and weight factor w being 0.05.
• We also consider the conventional single-agent AM meth-
ods corresponding to the two sets of PSNEs above.
– AM-BER: In this strategy, user i adopts the strategy
a∗i (γi) = argminai{wce(γi, ai) + ct(ai)} where
ce(γi, ai) = 0.2 exp
( − 1.5γi2ai−1
)
and weight factor
w = 50. This is the single-agent AM method that
corresponds to SupG-BER-θ∗ and SupG-BER-θ∗.
– AM-Pr: In this strategy, user i adopts the strategy
a∗i (γi) = argminai{wce(γi, ai) + ct(ai)} where
ce(γi, ai) =
− ln(5P¯b)(2
ai−1)
1.5γi
and weight factor w =
0.05. This is the single-agent AM method that cor-
responds to SupG-Pr-θ∗ and SupG-Pr-θ∗.
• We finally try a fixed rate strategy, 2-QAM (BPSK), i.e.,
the schedulers always transmit BPSK symbols whatever
the channel SNRs γ = (γ1, γ2) are.
The simulation results are shown in Fig. 5. We present the
transmission error rate by the BER in the entire NC-TWRC
system: the total number of erroneous bits divided by the total
number of bits sent by two schedulers. It can be seen that the
extremal PSNEs always incur slightly lower transmission error
rates than the corresponding conventional single-agent AM
methods. We also present the spectral efficiency as the number
of bits broadcast by the relay averaged over symbol durations.
It can be seen that the extremal PSNEs incur higher spectral
efficiencies than the corresponding conventional single-agent
AM methods. Both extremal PSNEs and conventional AM
schemes offer more flexible transmission control methods than
the fixed rate strategy. But, when the user-to-user channel
SNR is above 2dB, the spectral efficiency in NC-TWRC is
significantly improved by following the extremal PSNEs of
two-player SupG formulation. For example, when γ¯ = 6dB,
following SupG-Pr-θ∗ or SupG-Pr-θ∗ allows the relay to
exchange 4 more bits on average than AM-Pr.
In Fig. 6, we also show the broadcast rate at the relay in
the simulation. The broadcast rate is obtained as the number
of broadcasts at the relay averaged over symbol durations.
Since the transmission powers are all constant in our system
(Assumption 2.3), the broadcast rate shown in Fig. 6 also
indicates the average power consumption at the relay. It can be
seen that the adaptive transmission methods, the conventional
single-agent AM scheme and extremal PSNEs based on SupG
model, can adjust the transmission rate accordingly to channel
quality, i.e., the adaptive transmission methods become more
conservative when the channel SNR reduces. It also shows that
the smallest PSNEs, SupG-BER-θ∗ and SupG-Pr-θ∗, incur
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According to Theorem 4.7, the costs incurred by θ∗ are always lower than those incurred by θ∗.
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Fig. 6. The broadcast rate, the number of broadcasts averaged over symbol
durations, at the relay vs. average SNR γ¯ by following the strategies listed in
the experiment in Example 4.6. The simulation and system settings are the
same as in Fig. 5
approximately the same broadcast rate at the relay as the
corresponding conventional single-agent AM methods, AM-
BER and AM-Pr, respectively. Combined with the results in
Fig. 5, we can see that by following the smallest PSNEs there
are more bits delivered at the relay in each broadcast. It means
by consuming the same amount of transmission power as in the
conventional single-agent AM scheme, we can transmit more
symbols in NC-TWRC by following the smallest PSNEs.
D. Pareto Order of Extremal PSNEs
Based on Lemma 4.3(c), we prove the Pareto order of
extremal PSNEs in Ωγ as follows.
Theorem 4.7: In Ωγ , θ∗ Pareto dominates θ
∗
, i.e.,
ci(γi, θ
∗(γ)) ≤ ci(γi, θ∗(γ)),
for all γ and i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof: It can be seen that cr(ai, a−i) = a−iai+1 is nonde-
creasing in a−i. So, ci(γ, ai, a−i) is nondecreasing in a−i.
According to Lemma 4.3(c), Theorem 4.7 holds.
Theorem 4.7 in fact describes the preference order of the
extremal PSNEs. Since for both schedulers, θ∗ incurs less cost
than θ∗, they always prefer θ∗ to θ∗, i.e., in reality, both of
the schedulers will adopt θ∗. In fact, θ∗ Pareto dominates not
only θ∗ but also all other PSNEs. Since θ∗ is the smallest
PSNE of all PSNEs, if ci is nondecreasing in a−i in SupG
Ωγ , θ
∗ Pareto dominates all other PSNEs including θ∗, i.e.,
θ∗ is the most preferred equilibrium strategy among all PSNEs
[10].
Example 4.8: To show an example of Theorem 4.7, we also
record the mean costs incurred by following four extremal
PSNEs adopted in the experiment in Example 4.6. The results
are shown in Fig. 7, where we can see that the average costs
incurred by the smallest PSNEs are always lower than those
incurred by the largest ones.
V. SYMMETRY AND MONOTONICITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
In addition to the well-known results on SupG, we study
two more properties of PSNEs in Ωγ : the symmetry and the
monotonicity of θ∗ and θ∗ in SNR vector γ = (γ1, γ2). We
discuss how to use these two properties to simplify the PSNE
searching process.
If we assume homogenous players: The schedulers not only
adopt the same strategy set, i.e., Ai = A−i,9 but also use the
same SNR set, i.e., Γi = Γ−i,10 we can show that the extremal
PSNEs are symmetric in γ.
Theorem 5.1 (Symmetry of PSNEs): In Ωγ , if Γi = Γ−i,
θ
∗
and θ∗ are symmetric in γ, i.e.,
θ
∗
i (γi, γ−i) = θ
∗
−i(γ−i, γi),
θ∗i (γi, γ−i) = θ
∗
−i(γ−i, γi),
for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
9As stated in Assumption 2.1, A1 = A2 = {0, 1, . . . , Am}.
10Γi = Γ−i means: If Γ1 and Γ2 are infinite, the SNR variation range
of two user-to-user channels are the same; If Γ1 and Γ2 are finite, the
quantization levels of the SNR variation range of two user-to-user channels
are the same.
8 ADAPTIVE MODULATION IN NETWORK-CODED TWO-WAY RELAY CHANNEL: A SUPERMODULAR GAME APPROACH
Proof: Since Γi = Γ−i, the cost function is indifferent to
the identity of player, i.e., ci(γi, ai, a−i) = c−i(γ−i, a−i, ai).
Then, ψ is also identity-indifferent, i.e.,
ψi(γi, γ−i, a−i) = ψ−i(γ−i, γi, ai).
Since θ∗(γ) is a fixed point of the maximal best response
function ψ, we have θ∗(γ) = ψ(γ, θ∗(γ)). Then,
θ
∗
i (γi, γ−i) = ψi(γi, γ−i, θ
∗
−i(γi, γ−i))
= ψ−i(γ−i, γi, θ
∗
i (γ−i, γi))
= θ
∗
−i(γ−i, γi),
(7)
In the same way, we can show that the minimal best response
function ψ is also identity-indifferent and prove θ∗i (γi, γ−i) =
θ∗−i(γ−i, γi).
Based on Theorem 5.1, if we know the values of θ∗ and
θ
∗ at some γ = (γ1, γ2), then we automatically know the
values of θ∗ and θ∗ at γ = (γ2, γ1). This property can be
used to reduce the computational complexity in learning θ∗
and θ∗ in real applications. For example, by implementing the
Cournot tatonnement, we find that θ∗(5, 7) = (1, 4), then we
can directly assign θ∗(7, 5) = (4, 1) without running Cournot
tatonnement again for γ = (7, 5). By doing so, we just need
to know the values of θ∗ and θ∗ in half of the space of Γ.
So, the complexity of Cournot tatonnement is halved.
As explained in Section III, a PSNE is a function of
γ = (γ1, γ2), i.e., the PSNE assigns a strategy for each value
of SNR vector. It is then worth discussing how the extremal
PSNEs vary with γ, or whether there is some regularity in
the variations of θ∗ and θ∗. We study the monotonicity of the
θ
∗
and θ∗ in γ in the following context. We first introduce a
result in monotonic comparative statics11 as follows.
Lemma 5.2 (Monotonic PSNEs in SupG [11]): In SupG
Ωγ , if Γ is a poset12 and the cost function ci is submodular
in (γi, ai) for all a−i, the largest and smallest PSNEs, θ
∗
and θ∗, are nondecreasing in γ.
Based on Lemma 5.2, we can derive immediately the
sufficient condition for the monotonicity of θ∗ and θ∗ in Ωγ .
Theorem 5.3 (Monotonicity of PSNEs in γ): If ce is sub-
modular in (γi, ai), θ
∗
and θ∗ are nondecreasing in γ.
Proof: Γ = Γ1×Γ2 is a poset according to the definition
in Appendix A, and ci is submodular in (γi, ai) for all i if
ce is submodular in (γi, ai). Therefore, Lemma 5.2 holds for
game Ωγ if ce is submodular in (γi, ai). Therefore, θ
∗
and
θ∗ are nondecreasing in γ.
The following corollary shows one way to make Theo-
rem 5.3 hold by choosing a proper ce function.
Corollary 5.4: If ce(γi, ai) = − ln(5P¯b)(2
ai−1)
1.5γ
i
, Theo-
rem 5.3 holds.
11In economics, monotone comparative statics denotes the situation that the
optimal solution varies monotonically with the system parameters [22].
12See the definition of poset in Appendix A
Proof: When ce(γi, ai) = − ln(5P¯b)(2
ai−1)
1.5γ
i
, we have
ce(γ
+
i , ai) + ce(γ
−
i , ai + 1)− ce(γ−i , ai)
− ce(γ+i , ai + 1)
= − ln(5P¯b)
1.5
(2ai+1 − 1
γ−i
+
2ai − 1
γ+i
− 2
ai − 1
γ−i
− 2
ai+1 − 1
γ+i
)
= − ln(5P¯b)
1.5
(2ai
γ−i
− 2
ai
γ+i
)
≥ 0
for all γ+i ≥ γ−i . By Definition 4.1, ce is submodular.
Therefore, Theorem 5.3 holds.
The monotonicity of θ∗ and θ∗ can also be used to relieve
the complexity of the PSNE learning process. For example,
assume Theorem 5.3 holds and, by implementing the Cournot
tatonnement algorithm, we find that θ∗(6, 7) = (4, 6) and
θ∗(6, 7) = (2, 3). Due to the monotonicity of θ∗ and θ∗ in
γ, we know that θ∗(5, 7) ≤ (4, 6) and θ∗(6, 8) ≥ (2, 3).
So, when using Cournot tatonnement to find the value of θ∗
for γ = (5, 7), we can start with θ(0)(5, 7) = (4, 6) instead
of θ(0)(5, 7) = sup(A); when using Cournot tatonnement
to find the value of θ∗ for γ = (6, 8), we can start with
θ(0)(6, 8) = (2, 3) instead of θ(0)(6, 8) = inf(A). It can
be shown that a proper implementation of this method will
have the size of PSNE searching space decreasing gradually
in γ and therefore the complexity is reduced accordingly.
There also exist many other algorithms concerning how to
utilize the monotonicity of PSNEs to relive the computational
complexity. For example, the idea based on the works in [23],
[24] is that we just need to know the turning points in the
optimal monotonic strategy instead of learning the overview
of it, which sometimes can be accomplished by a multivariate
optimization algorithm. We do not extend further in this aspect
since it is beyond the scope our work and could be one of the
research directions in the future.
We show examples of Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.3 in
Figs. 8-10, where we set Am = 9 and the SNR sets (in
ratio) as Γ1 = Γ2 = {0.1, 1, 2, . . . , 10}.13 Fig. 8 shows
the largest PSNE θ∗ of Ωγ . In the game model, we use
ce(γi, ai) =
− ln(5P¯b)(2
ai−1)
1.5γi
and set w = 0.05. The symmetry
and monotonicity of θ∗1 and θ
∗
2 in γ can be clearly seen from
Fig. 8. The monotonicity of the smallest PSNEs θ∗ is shown
in Fig. 9. Since θ∗ is also symmetric in γ, we just show one
tuple of θ∗. We then change the ce in the game model to
ce(γi, ai) = 0.2 exp
(
− 1.5γi2ai−1
)
and set w = 50. The purpose
of changing the expression of ce is to breach the condition,
the submodularity of ce, so that Theorem 5.3 no longer holds.
We show θ∗1, the first tuple of θ
∗
, in Fig. 10. It can be seen
that θ∗1 is not nondecreasing in γ.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a two-player game model for the
adaptive m-QAM modulation problem in a NC-TWRC where
13Since SNR value is greater than 0, Γi starts from 0.1, instead of 0.
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Fig. 8. θ∗1 and θ
∗
2 , the equilibrium strategies of schedulers 1 and 2, respectively, in the largest PSNE θ
∗
of game Ωγ . In this game model, we use
ce(γi, ai) =
− ln(5P¯b)(2
ai−1)
1.5γi
and set w = 0.05. According to Corollary 5.4, Theorem 5.3 holds. Both θ∗1 and θ
∗
2 are nondecreasing in γ = (γ1, γ2).
Also, since A1 = A2 = {0, 1, . . . , 9} and Γ1 = Γ2 = {0.1, 1, 2, . . . , 10}, due to Theorem 5.1, θ
∗
i is symmetric in γ, i.e., θ
∗
1(γ1, γ2) = θ
∗
2(γ2, γ1).
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Fig. 9. θ∗1 , equilibrium strategy of scheduler 1 in the largest PSNE θ
∗
of game Ωγ . In this game model, we use ce(γi, ai) = − ln(5P¯b)(2
ai−1)
1.5γi
and set w = 0.05. According to Corollary 5.4, Theorem 5.3 holds. θ∗1 is
nondecreasing in γ = (γ1, γ2).
a two-phase AF-PNC scheme was adopted. We proved that
this game was supermodular so that the largest and smallest
PSNEs always existed. We showed that extremal PSNEs were
superior to the conventional AM scheme in enhancing spectral
efficiency while providing slightly better BERs. We proved
that the smallest PSNE always Pareto dominated the largest
one and derived the sufficient conditions for the largest and
smallest PSNEs to be symmetric and monotonic in user-to-
user channel SNRs.
As part of the conclusion, we point out to two directions of
the research work in the future. One is the equilibria searching
problem. The Cournot tatonnement presented in this paper
finds the PSNEs for each value of γ. The complexity would
be really high if the cardinality of SNR set Γ is large (an
extremal case is when Γ is infinite set, e.g., a continuum in
the real number set). To propose low complexity algorithms,
the results in Section V can be utilized. The other is to consider
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Fig. 10. θ∗1 , equilibrium strategy of scheduler 1 in the largest PSNE θ
∗
of
game Ωγ . In this game model, we use ce(γi, ai) = 0.2 exp
(
− 1.5γi
2ai−1
)
and
set w = 50. Theorem 5.3 no longer holds. In this case, θ∗1 is not monotonic
in γ = (γ1, γ2).
the case of imperfect channel estimation cases, which is a more
realistic assumption. In this case, one can model the game as
a Bayesian game and study its supermodularity and show the
existence and properties of Bayesian equilibria.
APPENDIX A
A set (L,≥) is a poset, partially ordered set, if the binary
relation ≥ is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive. If L
contains M -tuple numerical elements, ≥ is componentwise
greater than or equal to, i.e., let x = (x1, . . . , xM ) ∈ L, x ≥ y
if and only if xm ≥ ym for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
Definition A.1 (Lattice [12]): A poset L is a lattice if x1 ∨
x2 ∈ L and x1 ∧ x2 ∈ L for all x1,x2 ∈ L, where ∨ and ∧
denotes componentwise maximization and minimization.
Definition A.2 (Complete Lattice [12]): A lattic L is com-
plete if sup(L˜) ∈ L and inf(L˜) ∈ L for all nonempty L˜ ⊆ L.
sup(L˜) and inf(L˜) denote the componentwise supremum and
infimum of L˜, respectively.
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